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PROSECUTORIAL DUTY TO DISCLOSE
UNREQUESTED IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE:
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH
The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility
states that the primary duty of a prosecuting attorney "is to seek justice,
not merely to convict."' The prosecutorial duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence is founded on this principle.2 Serving as both adversary and
officer of the court,3 the prosecutor has an affirmative duty to ensure
that the criminally accused receives a fair trial at which all material
evidence is presented.4 To compensate for the inherent inequity cre-
ated by the government's vastly superior investigative resources, 5 and
1. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-13 (1979). The ABA Standards
Relating to the Prosecution Function similarly describe the prosecutor's unique position. "Al-
though the prosecutor operates within the adversary system, it is fundamental that his obligation is
to protect the innocent as well as to convict the guilty, to guard the rights of the accused as well as
to enforce the rights of the public." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO
THE PROSECtrrION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, Rule 1.1 Comment (1970). More-
over, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the prosecuting attorney is the repre-
sentative of "a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest.. . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win
a case, but that justice shall be done." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). Accord
Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 100 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) ("The state's pursuit is justice,
not a victim."). See generall, M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 79-80
(1975); Alderstein, Ethics, Federal Prosecutors, and the Federal Courts: Some Recent Problems, 6
HOFSTRA L. REV. 755 (1978); Note, Discovery and Disclosure: Dual Aspects ofthe Prosecutor's
Role in Criminal Procedure, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 92 (1965).
2. See Nakell, Criminal Discoveryfor the De/ense and the Prosecution-The Developing Con-
stitutional Considerations, 50 N.C.L. REV. 437, 452 (1972).
3. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. See also Comment, Suppression: The Prose-
cution's Failure to Disclose Evidence Favorable to the De/ense, 7 U.S.F.L. REV. 348, 348 (1973).
4. See in/ra note 7 and accompanying text.
5. Many courts and commentators argue that the imbalance caused by the state's sophisti-
cated information-gathering facilities undermines the criminal defendant's right to a fair trial.
See, e.g., Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 429
U.S. 545 (1977); Grant v. Alldredge, 498 F.2d 376, 381-82 (2d Cir. 1974); Raymond v. Illinois, 455
F.2d 62, 66 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972); United States v. Polisi, 416 F.2d 573, 577
(2d Cir. 1969); Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288, 297 (5th Cir. 1968); In re Kapatos, 208 F.
Supp. 883, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Goldstein, The State and the Accused Balance ofAdvantage in
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1172-98 (1960); Nakell, supra note 2, at 439-42; Note, The
Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the De/endant, 74 YALE L.J. 136, 142-43
(1964); Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose, 40 U. CHI. L. REV.
112, 112 (1972). See also M. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 81 ("There are very few of us against
whom a determined prosecutor could not make a 'plausible' case once the mighty investigatory
resources of the government have been brought to bear ... ").
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to safeguard a defendant's constitutional right to due process, 6 the pros-
ecutor is obligated to surrender to the defense certain information in
his possession.'
The Supreme Court first established a prosecutorial duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence in 1963 in Brady v. Maryland.' The Brady Court
held that, upon request, the prosecutor must disclose to the defense
favorable evidence that is material either to guilt or to punishment.9
Failure to do so, stated the Court, constitutes a violation of due process,
regardless of the prosecutor's good or bad faith.10 Subsequently, the
Supreme Court expanded Brady to include an obligation by the prose-
6. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part: "No person
shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST.
amend. V. In addition, the fourteenth amendment guarantees due process in state proceedings.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
One commentator recently suggested that due process as it applies to a criminal defendant re-
quires a state of affairs in which "nothing more can be done, within reason, to assure that the trial
process results in objectively correct factual determinations." Note, Toward a Constitutional Right
to an Adequate Folice Investigation: A Step Beyond Brady, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 835, 848 (1978).
Similarly, Justice Fortas, writing for a majority in In re Gault, stated:
[Tihe procedural rules which have been fashioned from the generality of due process are
our best instruments for the distillation and evaluation of essential facts from the con-
flicting welter of data that life and our adversary methods present. It is these instruments
of due process which enhance the possibility that truth will emerge from the confronta-
tion of opposing versions and conflicting data.
387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967). See also Griffin v. United States, 336 U.S. 704, 707-09 (1949); Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942), overruled on other grounds, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
7. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-88 (1963). There is, however, no constitutional
requirement of complete disclosure of prosecution files to the defense. See United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 109 (1976); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972). See infra notes 86-88 and
accompanying text.
Other sources of the prosecutorial duty to make certain disclosures, apart from the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, include Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the Jencks Act (18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976)). Rule 16 provides generally for disclosure
upon request of any relevant statement of the defendant, the defendant's prior criminal record,
documents or other tangible objects, and reports of examinations and tests. FED. R. CRIM. P.
16(a)(1)(A)-(D). The Jencks Act provides for disclosure to the defense by the government of any
statement made by a government witness. The Act stipulates, however, that the prosecutor must
turn over such material only after the witness has testified on direct examination, and pursuant to
a motion of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976).
The Jencks Act is a codification of Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), in which the
Supreme Court held that in federal cases, after a prosecution witness has testified at trial, the
defendant is entitled to inspect pretrial reports made to the government by the witness. Id at 668,
672.
8. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
9. Id at 87.
10. Id For a discussion of Brady, see infra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
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cutor to turn over to the accused all information that might be materi-
ally helpful to the defense of his case, I1 including evidence useful only
for impeachment of the credibility of government witnesses. 12
In 1976, the Supreme Court in United States v. AgursI3 refined the
Brady rule by recognizing a prosecutorial duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence even absent a focused defense request. 4 The Agurs Court
held that a defendant is entitled to reversal on the ground that the pros-
ecutor failed to volunteer unrequested information, however, only
when the undisclosed evidence creates a "reasonable doubt" about the
defendant's guilt. 5
In Garrison v. Maggio,' 6 decided shortly after Agurs, the Fifth Cir-
cuit confronted a fact situation in which the prosecutor failed volunta-
rily to disclose evidence that the defense could have used to challenge
the credibility of the government's only witness.' 7 The Fifth Circuit
went a step beyond Agurs, holding that when the defense fails to make
a specific request for evidence useful solely for impeachment purposes
and the prosecutor does not volunteer such evidence, a new trial will be
granted only if disclosure "probably would have resulted in an
acquittal."' 8
Although the Fifth Circuit consistently reaffirms its Garrison hold-
ing,'9 other courts are generally unreceptive to it.2" The Supreme
11. The state is under no obligation to disclose evidence that is not favorable to the defense.
See, e.g., United States v. Gorel, 622 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1979) (documents not related to any
witness' testimony need not be disclosed), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980); United States v. Izzi,
613 F.2d 1205, 1212-13 (1st Cir. 1980) (grand jury testimony of prosecution witnesses that varied
only slightly with trial testimony need not be disclosed); United States v. Zicree, 605 F.2d 1381,
1390 (5th Cir. 1979) (no duty to alert defendant to arguably exculpatory nature of witness' testi-
mony) ceri. denied, 445 U.S. 966 (1980); United States v. Wencke, 604 F.2d 607, 612 (9th Cir.
1979) (per curiam) (defendant must demonstrate exculpatory nature of undisclosed evidence in
order to obtain a reversal).
12. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972);
Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
13. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
14. Id at 106-07. For a more detailed discussion of.Agurs, see infra notes 54-68 and accom-
panying text.
15. 427 U.S. at 111-13.
16. 540 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 940 (1977).
17. Id at 1272-73.
18. Id at 1274.
19. See infra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 129-42 and accompanying text.
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Court has not reviewed the Fifth Circuit's approach.2'
This Note first traces the origin and development of the Brady rule in
the Supreme Court, and examines the policy considerations that under-
lie the nondisclosure rule. It then focuses on the specific problem of
prosecutorial nondisclosure of unrequested impeachment evidence,
placing particular emphasis on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Garrison
v. Maggio. Finally, the Note analyzes the validity of Garrison in light
of both prior Supreme Court decisions and the policies underlying the
prosecutor's disclosure duty. It concludes that the Fifth Circuit erred in
implementing a separate standard of review for impeachment evidence.
I. EVALUATION OF THE BZ4DY RULE
A. Origin and Development in the Supreme Court
The prosecutorial duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused
is traceable to the 1935 Supreme Court case of Mooney v. Holohan.22
In Mooney, the Supreme Court stated that the prosecutor's knowing
and intentional use of perjured testimony to procure a conviction is
repugnant to fundamental notions of justice and constitutes a violation
of due process. 2 3 After reaffirming this holding in several subsequent
decisions,24 the Supreme Court broadened the Mooney principle in
21. The petitioner in Garrison appealed the Fifth Circuit's decision to the Supreme Court,
but was denied certiorari. 431 U.S. 940 (1977).
22. 294 U.S. 103 (1935). In Mooney, the defendant, convicted of first degree murder, sought
a writ of habeas corpus claiming that the prosecutor had knowingly used fabricated testimony. Id
at 109-10. Investigations proved that the defendant's allegations were accurate. See Z. CHAFEE,
W. POLLAK & C. STERN, THE MOONEY-BILLINGS REPORT 185-86 (1932). The Mooney-Billings
Report, which was prepared by the Section on Lawless Enforcement of the Law to the Wicker-
sham Commission after an extensive examination of the evidence in the Mooney trial, concluded
that:
Witnesses were produced at the trials with information in the hands of the prosecution
that seriously challenged the credibility of the witnesses but this information was deliber-
ately concealed. Witnesses were permitted to testify at the trials despite such knowledge
in the possession of the prosecution of prior contradictory stories told by those witnesses,
as to make their mere production a vouching for perjured testimony.
Id at 242-43.
23. 294 U.S. at 112-13. The Court stated that the "deliberate deception of court and jury by
the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. . . is. . . inconsistent with the rudimentary
demands of justice." Id The Court noted that the prosecuting authorities, besides knowingly
using perjured testimony to obtain a conviction, also "deliberately suppressed evidence which
would have impeached. . . the testimony given against [the defendant]." Id at 110, 112. The
Court, however, reached its holding without confronting the issue raised by the suppressed im-
peachment evidence.
24. See, e.g., White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942). In
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss1/3
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1957 inAlcorta v. Texas.2" The Alcorta Court held that a denial of due
process accrues whenever a prosecutor knowingly fails to correct unso-
licited perjured testimony.26 Shortly thereafter, in Napue v. Illinois,27
the Court expanded Mooney still further, finding that a prosecutor's
knowing failure to correct perjured testimony that does not affect the
merits of a case, but relates solely to the credibility of a key prosecution
witness, sufficiently taints a conviction to warrant a new trial.28
In Brady v. Maryland,29 the Supreme Court ruled on the broad issue
of the prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.3" Rather
than focusing on the prosecutor's misconduct in obtaining convictions,
as it had in the earlier cases,31 the Court emphasized the overriding
importance of assuring the criminal defendant a fair trial.
32
In Brady, the petitioner and his companion, tried separately, were
each convicted of murder and sentenced to death.33 Despite pretrial
requests by petitioner's counsel that he be permitted to inspect all of the
Pvle, the Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's misconduct in soliciting perjured testimony to
obtain a conviction "sufficiently charge[d] a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Federal Con-
stitution" rendering void the defendant's conviction for murder and robbery. Id at 216.
25. 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
26. Id at 31. Thelcorta Court granted a new trial even though the perjured testimony was
inculpatory and did not result from the prosecutor's own efforts. The Court deemed sufficient the
prosecutor's knowing failure to correct the perjured testimony, and the relevance of the testimony
to the punishment assigned. Id See also United States exrel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815 (3d
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 904 (1953).
27. 360 U.S. 264 (1959). In Napue, the state's key witness falsely testified that the state had
promised him no consideration in return for his testimony. id at 265, 270-71. Although the
prosecuting attorney knew that this testimony was false, he failed to correct it. Id at 265, 267-68.
28. Id at 269.
29. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). For a general discussion of Brady, see Note, supra note 5. For an
historical account of the Brady case and the life of the defendant, John Brady, see R. HAMMER,
BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH (1969).
30. 373 U.S. at 84.
31. See supra notes 22-28, infra notes 69-71, and accompanying text. See generally Rusin,
The Prosecutor's Duty ofADisclosure: From Brady to Agurs and Beyond, 69 J. CRIM. L. & C. 197,
198 (1978); Comment, supra note 5, at 114.
32. Several lower courts had already undergone this shift in emphasis. See, e.g., Kyle v.
United States, 294 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir. 1961) (if nondisclosure is sufficiently harmful to defend-
ant's case, a new trial is required notwithstanding the existence of prosecutorial misconduct), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 909 (1964); United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 569-70
(2d Cir. 1961) (defendant was granted new trial due to negligent suppression of government docu-
ments material to the conduct of his defense); United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d
763, 767 (3d Cir.) (court ignored prosecutorial misconduct in nondisclosure of testimony tending
to corroborate defendant's exonerating claim of intoxication, focusing instead on defendant's abil-
ity to present defense), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955).
33. 373 U.S. at 84.
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companion's extrajudicial statements, the prosecutor failed to disclose a
statement in which the companion had confessed to the homicide.34
The Brady Court directly examined the impact of the nondisclosure on
the defendant's ability to present his defense.35 Affirming the Mary-
land Court of Appeals' reversal of the conviction,36 the Supreme Court
ruled that irrespective of a prosecutor's good or bad faith, due process
is denied if the requested, yet undisclosed, evidence is favorable to an
accused and material either to guilt or punishment.
37
34. Id Although the petitioner admitted his participation in the crime, he maintained that
his companion had actually killed the victim. Proof of this allegation was crucial because the jury
could then mitigate petitioner's punishment to life imprisonment rather than death, pursuant to a
Maryland statute. Id at 85.
Although the prosecutor had tendered all other extrajudicial statements to the defense counsel,
he failed to disclose the companion's unsigned confession because he interpreted a Maryland rule
of law to deem the confession inadmissible at trial. Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422, 427, 174 A.2d
167, 169-70 (1961). Apparently, the prosecutor had made a good faith mistake, believing the
disclosure requirement to apply only to admissible evidence. See Comment, Materiality and De-
fense Requests: Aids in Defning the Prosecutor's Duty of Disclosure, 59 IowA L. REV. 433, 436
(1973).
Since the decision in Brady v. Maryland, courts have generally declined to require admissibility
as a prerequisite to triggering the duty of disclosure. See, e.g., United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d
1042, 1058 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Jordan, 399 F.2d 610, 615 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1005 (1968); North Am. Rockwell Corp. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 866, 873 (10th Cir. 1968); Em-
mett v. Ricketts, 397 F. Supp. 1025, 1037-38 (N.D. Ga. 1975). But see United States exrel. Wilson
v. State, 437 F. Supp. 407 (D. Del. 1977); In re Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d 525, 487 P.2d 1234, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 594 (1971); Thornton v. State, 238 Ga. 160, 231 S.E.2d 729 (1977); Comment, People v.
Rutherford: The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose, 6 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 851, 857-58 (1976) (in
order to obtain reversal, defense must show that undisclosed evidence is admissible).
Some courts require the prosecutor to disclose inadmissible evidence only if it might lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Wigoda, 521 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 949 (1976); United States v. Ahmad, 53 F.R.D. 186 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
A majority of the Supreme Court has never directly confronted the issue of admissibility. Jus-
tice Fortas, however, concurring in Giles v. Maryland, rejected the idea of an admissibility require-
ment: "[t]he state may not be excused from its duty to disclose material facts ... solely because
of a conclusion that they would not be admissible at trial." Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98
(1967) (Fortas, J., concurring). See generally Rusin, supra note 31, at 209-10.
35. 373 U.S. at 87. The petitioner did not learn of the undisclosed evidence until he was
convicted and sentenced. Most cases, including Brady, do not reveal how the defendant discov-
ered the nondisclosure. Undoubtedly, it is not unusual for the undisclosed evidence to go unno-
ticed indefinitely. United States ex rel Hill v. Deegan, 268 F. Supp. 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
exemplifies the element of chance involved in uncovering undisclosed evidence. In Deegan, a key
prosecution witness testified at trial and subsequently informed the prosecutor that he had made a
mistake in his testimony. When the prosecutor refused to take any remedial action, the witness
himself came forward to correct the error. Id at 585-86.
36. Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422, 174 A.2d 167 (1961).
37. 373 U.S. at 84-87, 91. Specifically, the Court held that "the suppression by the prosecu-
tion of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss1/3
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Although Brady clearly established a prosecutorial duty of disclo-
sure, the Court failed to define the extent of its new rule or to enunciate
specific guidelines for its implementation.3 8 Two major questions left
unanswered were whether a defense request for specific information
was necessary to trigger operation of the Brady rule,39 and what type of
evidence was sufficiently significant to be considered "material."4
material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecu-
tion." Id at 87. Justice Douglas enunciated the rationale behind the Court's decision:
A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made avail-
able, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears
heavily on the defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a
proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice....
Id at 87-88.
38. See Note, Implementing Brady v. Maryland: An Arsument for a Pretrial Open File Pol-
ijog 43 U. CIN. L. REv. 889, 889 (1974); Comment, supra note 5, at 115; 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 480,
483.
39. The defense in Brady had made a request for the undisclosed evidence. 373 U.S. at 84.
Without addressing the question directly, the Brady Court implied that a defense request may be
essential to finding a breach of the prosecutor's duty. Numerous post-Brady lower court decisions,
however, held that a defense request was unnecessary to trigger application of the Brady rule. See,
e.g, Davis v. Heyd, 479 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455 (9th Cir.
1972); Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288 (5th
Cir. 1968); Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Barbee v. Warden, Md. Peniten-
tiary, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964); United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135 (2d Cir.
1964); Castleberry v. Crisp, 414 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Okla. 1976). See also Comment, supra note 5,
at 117 ("To hold a request indispensable would allow the prosecutor to suppress even evidence
crucial to the defense so long as the defense was unaware of it."). See generally C. WHITEBREAD,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 20.02, at 398 (1980).
In 1967, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction in the absence of a defense request. Giles v.
Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967). In his plurality opinion, Justice Brennan stated that the trial court
had "ordered a new trial, despite the absence of a pretrial request of defense counsel for disclosure
of the evidence suppressed." Id at 73. Justice Fortas, in a concurring opinion, concluded that the
duty to disclose should not depend on the existence of a request: "I see no reason to make the
result turn on the adventitious circumstance of a request." Id at 102 (Fortas, J., concurring).
Finally, in United States v. Agurs, the Burger Court held that the absence of a defense request does
not automatically render a Brady claim invalid. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
40. See generally Comment, supra note 5, at 125-31 ("The most difficult problem created by
the Brady decision has been that of materiality." Id at 125).
Other questions left unanswered by Brady relate to the timing of disclosure, who should decide
what evidence must be disclosed, whether there is an implied duty to preserve the evidence, and
whether the duty applies to inadmissible evidence. See generally C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 39,
§ 20.03 at 398-406; Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose After United States v. Agurs, 1977 U.
ILL. L.F. 690, 691; Comment supra note 5, at 112, 117-25; Comment, supra note 3, at 349.
The point in the proceedings at which the prosecutor must reveal exculpatory evidence contin-
ues to be an area of debate. Courts and commentators are divided between pretrial disclosure and
disclosure at trial. Compare United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir.) (favoring pretrial
disclosure), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976); United States v. Bonanno, 430 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 964 (1970); United States v. Trainor, 423 F.2d 263 (Ist Cir. 1970)
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Appeals by defendants alleging due process violations because of
prosecutorial nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence immediately inun-
dated the lower courts.4 ' The lower courts' interpretations of the Brady
rule reflected an expansionist trend,42 exemplified by holdings relaxing
(same); United States v. Polisi, 416 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1969) (same); United States v. Deutsch, 373
F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (same); Note, supra note 5, at 149 ("[tlhe only reasonable time for
the prosecutor to reveal his evidence is during the pretrial period) and Comment, supra note 5, at
118 ("because of the multiple uses to which defendants can put undisclosed information in prepar-
ing their defense, pretrial disclosure seems the desirable alternative") with United States ex rel.
Lucas v. Regan, 503 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1974) (Brady requires disclosure at trial), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 939 (1975); United States v. Moore, 439 F.2d 1107 (6th Cir. 1971) (same); United States v.
Conder, 423 F.2d 904 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 958 (1970) and 65 GEO. L.J. 209, 320
(1976-77) (Brady should not be a pretrial remedy). See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL §§ 2.1(c), 2.2(a) (Tent. Draft,
May 1969) ("prosecutor should perform these obligations as soon as practicable following the
filing of charges against the accused"); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS RELATING TO
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3.11 (1970) (prosecutor's failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence "at the earliest feasible opportunity constitutes unprofessional con-
duct"). Among all courts and commentators, however, the central concern is prejudice to the
defendant resulting from the prosecutor's delay in disclosure. C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 39,
§ 20.03, at 401. The Supreme Court has yet to confront the issue.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of who-the defense counsel, the trial
judge, or the prosecution-must determine what evidence is favorable and material under Brady.
Courts uniformly exclude the defense as a possibility, as this would require the prosecutor to
disclose his entire file to the defense. See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. In addition,
courts generally reject in camera examination by the trial judge, usually out of considerations of
judicial economy. Another objection to such a procedure is that the judge cannot identify what
evidence is favorable to a defendant's case as easily as the prosecutor can, especially during the
pretrial stages of a proceeding. Thus, by default courts usually require the prosecution to deter-
mine what evidence must be disclosed under Brady. Unfortunately, this places the prosecutor in
the awkward position of having to view the evidence from the perspective of the defense. One
commentator suggested that "it may be unrealistic to suppose that an adversary can act with the
objectivity that this requires." Comment, supra note 5, at 121. See generally C. WHITEBREAD,
supra note 39, § 20.05, at 403; Note, supra note 5, 138-40; Comment, supra note 5, at 120-21.
The Supreme Court also has not resolved the problem of lost or destroyed potential Brady
material. Lower courts generally agree that the duty to disclose encompasses a duty to preserve.
Any other conclusion would undermine the spirit of Brady. The breadth of the duty, however,
and the availability of sanctions for nonconformance with it are not clearly defined. The problem
of sanctions is peculiar: application of the usual sanction for nondisclosure-a new trial-would
be ineffective given that the evidence no longer exists. See United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642,
653 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (prosecutor obligated to preserve any evidence that might be favorable). See
generally Rusin, supra note 31, at 220-24.
Finally, the Supreme Court has not addressed the question of whether potential Brady material
must be admissible at trial. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
42. See Comment, Defendant Not Entitled to New Trial Unless Evidence Suppressed by Prose-
cution Probabl Would Have Resulted in an Acquittal, 48 MIss. L.J. 647, 649 (1977); Comment,
supra note 5, at 115-32.
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defense request requirements,43 and holdings extending the prosecu-
tor's disclosure duty to favorable evidence within any "arm of the gov-
ernment."44 These courts, however, reached inconsistent results on
many of the important post-Brady issues.45
The Supreme Court did not directly confront another nondisclosure
case until nearly a decade after Brady,4 6 when it decided Giglio v.
United States.47 The Giglio Court relied on both Napue48 and Brady to
hold that undisclosed evidence tending to impeach the testimony of a
43. See cases cited supra note 39.
44. See. e.g.. United States v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55, 57-58 (5th Cir. 1973) (disclosure ofpostal
employee's personnel file required); Smith v. Florida, 410 F.2d 1349, 1351 (5th Cir. 1969) (prose-
cutor responsible for suppression by police); Barbee v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842,
846 (4th Cir. 1964) (prosecutor responsible for suppression of favorable ballistics report, notwith-
standing his noninvolvement).
45. Post-Brady courts adopted essentially two standards of materiality by which a prosecutor
could gauge his disclosure obligation. The standard generally applied to situations in which the
prosecutor deliberately suppressed evidence favorable to the accused was whether such evidence
might have affected the judgment of the jury. See, e.g., Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 291
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (reversal mandated if evidence "might have led the jury to entertain a reasonable
doubt about [defendant's] guilt"). See also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972);
Woodcock v. Amaral, 511 F.2d 985, 989-93 (Ist Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975);
United States v. Pfingst, 490 F.2d 262, 275-78 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 919 (1974);
United States v. Diaz-Rodriguez, 478 F.2d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir. 1973). Deterrence of prosecutorial
misconduct was a prime concern in these cases.
Post-Brady courts employed a stricter materiality standard for cases in which the prosecutor in
good faith neglected to disclose exculpatory evidence. Typically, the reviewing court would man-
date a new trial if "there was a significant change that this added item [of evidence], developed by
a skilled counsel. . . could have induced a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to
avoid a conviction." United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825, 832 (2d Cir. 1969). See also United
States v. Crow Dog, 532 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 929 (1977); United States
v. Marrero, 516 F.2d 12 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 862 (1975); United States v. Seijo, 514
F.2d 1357 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1043 (1977); United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d
1323 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975), vacated in part, 413 F. Supp. 845 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Evans v. Janing, 489 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1973); Ross v. Texas, 474 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 850 (1973); United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968). In the passive good faith nondisclosure cases, courts weighed
the policy interest in the finality of convictions against the goal of safeguarding the defendant's
right to due process. See 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. supra note 38, at 486.
46. In 1967, however, the Supreme Court in Giles v. Maryland had an opportunity to examine
major ambiguities of Brady; specifically, what type of evidence is sufficiently material to require
disclosure, and whether a defense request is a prerequisite to disclosure. The petitioner in Giles,
following a conviction for rape, sought a new trial alleging that the prosecutor failed to reveal
evidence that would impeach the credibility of the prosecutrix. With the introduction of new
evidence that the lower courts had not considered, however, the Supreme Court was able to re-
mand the case without examining the Brady issues. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
47. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
48. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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key prosecution witness was sufficiently material to the defense to war-
rant a new trial because there existed a "reasonable likelihood that the
evidence could have affected the judgment of the jury."' 9 The Court,
however, did not render this standard generally applicable to all Brady
situations, but rather implied that it should be confined to situations in
which the undisclosed evidence revealed perjured testimony.50
In United States v. Agurs,5 I the Supreme Court attempted to address
the major issues left unresolved by Brady. The defendant in Agurs,
convicted of murder, moved for a new trial on the ground that the pros-
ecutor failed to disclose the murder victim's prior criminal record.52
The defendant asserted that such evidence, which tended to prove the
victim's violent character, supported her self-defense theory of the
case. 3 The defense attorney, however, had made no pretrial request
for the evidence.54
The Agurs Court enunciated a multi-tiered standard of review for
determining the materiality of undisclosed evidence,5 5 defining three
possible situations in which the prosecutor's failure to disclose might
49. 405 U.S. at 154 (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. at 271). The prosecutor who had
presented the case to the grand jury promised the witness that he would not be prosecuted if he
agreed to testify. The state's witness, however, testified at trial that he had received no promises of
consideration in exchange for his testimony. The trial prosecutor, having no knowledge of the
prior exchange, failed to reveal that such a promise had in fact been made. Id at 152-54. The
Court's reversal of the conviction notwithstanding the prosecutor's good faith reaffirmed the view
that the possibility of harm to the defendant rather than the prosecutor's misconduct is determina-
tive in ascertaining whether constitutional rights of due process have been satisfied.
50. 405 U.S. at 154. See also Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972). In MAoore, decided in the
same term as Giglio, the Supreme Court held that information tending to impeach one of the
state's key witnesses was not sufficiently material to require disclosure, because of the strong evi-
dence of guilt and the speculative nature of the undisclosed evidence. Id. at 797.
51. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
52. Id at 100-01. The victim's prior record included two convictions, one for assault and
carrying a deadly weapon and the other for carrying a deadly weapon. Id
53. Id at 100. The basis of the self-defense theory was that the defendant screamed for help,
and that the victim had two knives in his possession. Id
54. Id at 99.
55. Id at 103-08. Prior to Agurs, the Second Circuit had developed its own multiple stan-
dard of materiality for nondisclosure cases. United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968).
Judge Friendly, writing for the majority in Keogh, grouped cases involving undisclosed evidence
into three categories: (1) deliberate prosecutorial suppression of obviously exculpatory evidence
with intent to harm the defense (convictions in this category "clearly require a reversal"); (2) de-
liberate suppression of specifically requested evidence with no intent to harm the defense (convic-
tions in this category are "mandated"); (3) passive nondisclosure of unrequested evidence which
in hindsight could have benefitted the defense (standard of materiality must be considerably
higher). Id at 146-48.
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result in a due process violation.5 6 In the first situation, if the undis-
closed evidence reveals that the state's case included perjured testi-
mony and that the prosecutor knew or should have known of the
perjury,57 the nondisclosure is material and a new trial should be
granted "if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony
could have affected the judgment of the jury."58 In the second situa-
tion, if the prosecutor fails to respond to a specific pretrial request by
the defense,59 a conviction must be set aside if the undisclosed evidence
"might have affected the outcome of the trial."60
The third situation arises when the prosecutor fails to disclose excul-
patory evidence that the defense did not specifically request. 6t  The
Court asserted that the standard of materiality applied in such a situa-
tion should be stringent, because the prosecutor will not have violated
his constitutional duty to disclose unless his omission is of "sufficient
significance to result in denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial. '62
The Court concluded that when the defense makes only a general re-
quest 63 or no request at all for the exculpatory evidence, a new trial will
56. Id at 103-08. The Court noted that each of the three situations concerns the post-trial
discovery of information previously known to the prosecution but not to the defense. Id at 103.
The defendant's awareness at trial of the existence of the undisclosed evidence is fatal to his Brady
claim. See Stubbs v. Smith, 533 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Riley, 530 F.2d 767 (8th
Cir. 1976); Maglaya v. Buchkoe, 515 F.2d 265 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 931 (1975).
57. See, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); supra notes 22-23 and accompanying
text. See also Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) (prosecution deliberately used perjured testimony);
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (prosecutor knowingly failed to correct perjured testimony);
Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942) (same).
58. 427 U.S. at 103-04. Accord Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). See supra
text accompanying note 49. The standard of materiality for this type of nondisclosure is most
lenient, because the Agurs Court viewed it as "a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the
criminal process." 427 U.S. at 104.
59. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
60. 427 U.S. at 104. The Court reasoned that because a focused defense request puts the
prosecutor on notice that exculpatory information could be in his possession, his failure to disclose
is "seldom, if ever, excusable." The Court stated further that:
Although there is no duty to provide defense counsel with unlimited discovery of every-
thing known by the prosecutor, if the subject matter of such a request is material, or
indeed if a substantial basis for claiming materiality exists, it is reasonable to require the
prosecutor to respond either by furnishing the information or by submitting the problem
to the trial judge.
Id at 106.
61. See, e.g., id; Garrison v. Maggio, 540 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1976), cer. denied, 431 U.S. 940
(1977).
62. 427 U.S. at 108.
63. After Brady v. Maryland, defense attorneys routinely began to file motions requesting
pretrial production of "all Brady material"-that is, any evidence favorable to the accused that is
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be mandated only if the evidence creates a "reasonable doubt" about
guilt or punishment.64
Before adopting its "reasonable doubt" standard, the Agurs Court
specifically rejected as too burdensome the standard of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 33, which entitles a defendant to a new trial based
on newly discovered evidence if the evidence "probably would have
resulted in an acquittal."65
material either to guilt or to punishment. Some courts refer to this motion as a "fishing expedi-
tion." See, e.g., United States v. McCarthy, 292 F. Supp. 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); United States v.
Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). In most cases, courts mandate no disclosure beyond
that to which the defendant is entitled under Rule 16. See supra note 7. See generally Comment,
Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty of Disclosure: Developing Standards Under Brady v. Maryland, 33
U. PiTT. L. REv. 785 (1972).
64. 427 U.S. at 112-13. After applying this high standard to the undisclosed evidence
presented in the case before it, theAgurs Court held that the evidence was not material because, in
the context of the entire record, the trial judge had remained convinced of the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id at 114. The Supreme Court's holding in Agurs clarified the post-
Brady controversy over the necessity of a defense request. See supra note 39 and accompanying
text.
65. 427 U.S. at 111. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 33. Rule 33 provides:
The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to him if required in the
interest of justice. If trial was by the court without a jury the court on motion of a
defendant for a new trial may vacate the judgment if entered, take additional testimony
and direct the entry of a new judgment. A motion for a new trial based on the ground of
newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within two years after final judg-
ment, but if an appeal is pending the court may grant the motion only on remand of the
case. A motion for a new trial based on any other grounds shall be made within 7 days
after verdict or finding of guilty or within such further time as the court may fix during
the 7 day period.
Id Although Rule 33 itself does not employ the "probable acquittal" language, courts have tradi-
tionally interpreted the rule to require a showing that the newly discovered evidence would proba-
bly produce an acquittal on retrial. This standard was first enunciated in Berry v. Georgia, 10 Ga.
511, 527 (1851):
Upon the following points there seems to be a pretty general concurrence of authority,
viz: that it is incumbent on a party who asks for a new trial, on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, to satisfy the Court, Ist. That the evidence has come to his knowl-
edge since the trial. 2d. That it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not
come sooner. 3d. That it is so material that it would probably produce a different verdict,
if the new trial were granted. 4th. That it is not cumulative only-viz; speaking to facts,
in relation to which there was evidence on the trial. 5th. That the affidavit of the witness
himself should be produced, or its absence accounted for. And 6th, a new trial will not be
granted, if the only object of the testimony is to impeach the character or credit of a
witness.
id
See also United States v. Curran, 465 F.2d 260, 264 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Rodriguez,
437 F.2d 940, 941-42 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Martinez, 436 F.2d 12, 15 (9th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 959 (1971); United States v. Craft, 421 F.2d 693, 695 (9th Cir. 1970); Edgar
v. Finley, 312 F.2d 533, 536-37 (8th Cir. 1963). Rule 33 applies only to evidence discovered from
a neutral source after trial; prosecutorial misconduct is not at issue. FED. R. CRIM, P. 33.
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B. Policy Considerations
The early nondisclosure cases, typified by Mooney and Alcorta,6 6
were based on a policy of deterrence of prosecutorial misconduct.67
The Supreme Court sought to discourage prosecutors from obtaining
convictions through the deliberate use of perjured testimony or the
knowing failure to correct it.68
Brady v. Maryland69 marked a departure from the deterrence ration-
ale: the Supreme Court began to focus on the effect of the nondisclo-
sure on the defendant's capacity to present his defense, rather than on
the prosecutor's malfeasance.70 Brady and its progeny reasoned that a
prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence deprives a defend-
66. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
67. See also Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 214 (1942); Ingram v. Peyton, 367 F.2d 933, 936
(4th Cir. 1966); United States ex rel Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382, 387 (N.D. I11. 1949);
People v. Savvides, I N.Y.2d 554, 556-57, 136 N.E.2d 853, 854-55, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (1956).
See general' Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. Rnv. 71, 121-23 (1974).
68. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text. By finding such conduct inconsistent with
a defendant's fifth amendment due process right, the Mooney line of cases prevented prosecutors
from easily manipulating or controlling trial evidence. See Westen, supra note 67, at 121-23.
69. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). For a discussion of Brady, see supra notes 29-40 and accompanying
text.
70. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87. The Brady Court stated that the unfairness, and
hence the violation of due process, inherent in the prosecutor's failure to disclose material excul-
patory evidence, stems from his role as an "architect of a proceeding" who helps to "shape a trial
that bears heavily on the defendant." Id at 88. See also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97
(1976); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Clarke v. Burke, 440 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039 (1972); United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968); Barbee v.
Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
this position in Smith v. Phillips, 102 S. Ct. 940, 947-48 (1982), when it held that prosecutorial
misconduct alone, without a concurrent impairment of the defendant's right to a fair trial, did not
require a reversal. For a collection of decisions in the area, see Annot., 34 A.L.R. 3d 16 (1980).
See generally Nakell, The Effect of Due Process on Criminal Defense Discovery, 62 Ky. L.J. 58
(1973).
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, arguably signifies a resur-
rection of the deterrence rationale initiated in the 1930s and a simultaneous withdrawal from
exclusive concentration on the defendant's due process right to present all material exculpatory
evidence. Although the Court explicitly disclaimed any reliance on prosecutorial misconduct in
establishing its three-tier materiality test, see id at 110, the Agurs decision implicitly applied the
principle espoused in Mooney that the prosecutor's culpability is a critical factor in a due process
violation. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. Both the prosecutor's knowing use of
perjured testimony and his intentional concealment of exculpatory evidence seem to affect equally
the defendant's ability to develop his defense, as both types of conduct have the effect of conceal-
ing the truth. The Agurs Court, nevertheless, distinguished the former fact situation, applying a
stricter standard of materiality to it. 427 U.S. at 103-06. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying
text. The Court apparently found the prosecutor's intentional presentation of false testimony
more reprehensible. For a similar analysis. see Recent Development, The Prosecutor's Constitu-
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ant of a fair trial, regardless of whether the nondisclosure is inten-
tional7' or merely negligent.7 2
The Supreme Court's shift in emphasis between Mooney and Brady
can be traced to the trend, commencing in the early 1960's, toward
broadened defense discovery in criminal cases73 and the corresponding
expansion of procedural rights of the criminally accused.7 4 Proponents
tional Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence in the Absence of a Focused Request from the De-
fense-United States v. Agurs, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 319, 332 (1976).
Emphasis on prosecutorial malfeasance also explains the Court's differing standards for the
second and third categories of cases presented. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
According to Agurs, the defendant who fails to make a specific request for exculpatory evidence
bears a greater burden of showing materiality than the defendant who makes such a request. See
427 U.S. at 104-07. Again, the defendant's presentation of his case is equally impaired under
either scenario. Thus, if the Court had focused strictly on the defendant's right to a fair trial, it
would not have distinguished the two situations.
Within each of the three nondisclosure situations, however, the Agurs Court continued to focus
on the fairness of the proceedings to the defendant by framing each standard in terms of the effect
of the undisclosed evidence on the outcome of the trial. See supra notes 58, 60, 61 & 63 and
accompanying text.
71. Courts have defined "deliberate" nondisclosure as including not only a premeditated de-
cision to suppress material exculpatory evidence with specific intent to harm the defendant's case,
but also a failure to disclose favorable evidence whose blatant significance to the defense could not
have escaped the prosecutor's attention. See United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968).
See also M. v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 3d 782, 144 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1977) (intentional sup-
pression of material evidence that may be favorable to defendant, despite request, constitutes
violation of due process irrespective of good or bad faith of prosecutor).
72. See cases cited supra note 73.
The phrase "negligent nondisclosure" is used interchangeably with "passive suppression."
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Brady, numerous lower federal courts have recognized that
even a prosecutor's negligent failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence on the part of the
prosecutor could provide grounds for reversal. See, e.g., United States v. McCrane, 527 F.2d 906
(3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Fried, 486 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 983
(1974); United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969); Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287
(D.C. Cir. 1966); United States v. Aprea, 358 F. Supp. 1126 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Imbler v. Craven,
298 F. Supp. 795 (C.D. Cal. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 865 (1970). See also Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
73. See Nakell, supra note 2, at 437-38. Criminal discovery did not exist at common law.
Rex v. Holland, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792).
74. The Warren Court enunciated a series of procedural safeguards which served to constitu-
tionalize standards of broad discovery. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth
amendment right to jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (sixth amendment right to
compulsory process); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment right of confronta-
tion); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (sixth amendment right to counsel); Brady v. Mary-
land, 373 U.S. 83 (1973) (fourteenth amendment right to due process); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth
amendment protection against unlawful search and seizure). See generally Pye, The Warren Court
and Criminal Procedure, 67 MIct. L. REv. 249 (1968).
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of liberal discovery 75 contrasted the state's elaborate fact-gathering
mechanisms7 6-- including police investigations,7" formal pretrial proce-
dures for obtaining evidence, 78 and discovery directly from the ac-
cused 79-with the haphazard investigative resources available to the
75. Proponents of broad discovery include Supreme Court Justice Brennan, Justice Traynor
(former Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court), Professors Wigmore, Goldstein, Louisell,
and Pyc, the American Law Institute, and the American Bar Association. See People v. Riser, 47
Cal. 2d 566, 585-86, 305 P.2d 1, 13 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1957); State v. Tune, 13 N.J.
203, 227-35, 98 A.2d 881, 894-98 (1953) (Brennan, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 907 (1955);
6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1850-1855a (3d ed. 1940); ALI-ABA JOINT COMM. ON CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUC., THE PROBLEM OF DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES (1961); ABA ADVISORY COMM.
ON PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS, STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE
TRIAL (Tent. Draft, May 1969); Brennan, Remarks on Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 56 (1963); Brennan,
The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Questfor Truth?, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279; Goldstein,
The State andtheAccused- Balance ofAdvantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960);
Louisell, Criminal Discovery- Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 56 (1961); Louisell,
The Theor' of Criminal Discovery and the Practice of Criminal Law, 14 VAND. L. REV. 921 (1961);
Pye, The Defendant's Casefor More Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 82 (1963); Traynor, Ground Lost
and Found in Criminal Discover); 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 228 (1964). Contra Grady, Discovery in
Criminal Cases, 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 827.
76. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
77. For instance, in many cases police arrive at the scene of the crime almost immediately
and begin gathering physical and testimonial evidence. Thus, the state promptly obtains an ad-
vantage over the accused from the time of preliminary investigation until evidence is sufficient to
establish probable cause to bring charges. In addition, the government is well equipped with
trained and experienced staff, laboratory and technical facilities, the mutual aid of other law en-
forcement agencies, and the aid of informants. See Nakell, supra note 2, at 439-40; Note, supra
note 5, at 836. In addition, Professor Nakell points out that most citizens, including witnesses to
crime, have a natural inclination to cooperate with police officers conducting an investigation.
Nakell, supra note 2, at 440.
78. For example, the grand jury procedure, which is attended only by grand jurors, the prose-
cuting attorney, and the testifying witness, enables the state to compel testimony and production
of physical and documentary evidence. Although the original purpose behind the fifth amend-
ment right to a grand jury indictment in federal felony proceedings was to ensure that a person
would not be prosecuted unless a body of citizens first found probable cause to charge him, the
grand jury practice evolved into a highly important investigative mechanism, deriving significance
from its power of compulsory process. See Nakell, supra note 2, at 440-41. Moreover, the grand
jury inquiry is not restricted by the rules of evidence, and the accused has no right to appear
before the grand jury and confront witnesses. Accordingly, one court has described the grand
jury's investigative function as a "fishing expedition." Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855,
862-63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956). Although indictment by grand jury is not
constitutionally mandated in state proceedings, a majority of states retains this pretrial mechanism
as a means of establishing the existence of probable cause. See generally C. WHITEBREAD, supra
note 42, §§ 19.01-.07, at 375-91; Steele, Right to Counsel at the Grand Jury Stage of Criminal Pro-
ceedings, 36 Mo. L. REV. 193 (1971).
Professor Nakell delineates several other formal pretrial information-gathering devices, includ-
ing the coroner's inquest in homicide cases and the preliminary hearing. Nakell, supra note 2, at
441.
79. Within the limits of appropriate constitutional provisions, the prosecution may search the
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often-indigent defendant. 80
Commentators argued specifically that the prosecutor, in his role as
administrator of justice, could expedite the truth-seeking process by
presenting any available exculpatory evidence to the defense.8 Such a
practice not only would permit the innocent defendant to prepare prop-
erly to meet the issues at trial,82 but would also allow the guilty defend-
ant to assess intelligently his plea bargaining position.8 3  In addition,
proponents argued that broad defense discovery would preserve the
finality of convictions by limiting the number of appeals stemming
from alleged due process violations.84
Although the Supreme Court consistently has acknowledged the ne-
cessity of providing the accused with an adequate opportunity to pre-
accused and seize physical evidence from his possession, may interrogate the accused and may
derive evidence from the accused through electronic eavesdropping and wiretapping. Moreover,
the state may compel the defendant to provide fingerprints and handwriting and voice exemplars
for identification, and to participate in a properly conducted lineup. Finally, a prosecutor may
obtain blood or urine samples from the accused for scientific analysis. See generally Nakell, supra
note 2, at 441-42.
80. See generally ALI-ABA JOINT COMM., supra note 80, at 4-6; Nakell, supra note 2, at 439-
42; Pye, supra note 75, at 86.
81. Nakell, supqra note 2, at 443. See also People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956)
("To deny flatly any right of production on the ground that an imbalance would be created be-
tween the advantages of prosecution and defense would be to lose sight of the true purpose of a
criminal trial, the ascertainment of the facts." Id at 586, 305 P.2d at 13.).
Many supporters of liberal criminal discovery also advocate open file disclosure on the part of
the prosecutor. See, e.g., Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Questfor Truth?,
1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279; Goldstein, supra note 80, at 1152; Pye, supra note 80, at 830; Traynor,
supra note 80, at 228; Comment, supra note 5, at 113. See also 2 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE § 11-2.1 (2nd ed. 1980) (providing in part that, "(a) upon request of the defense, the
prosecuting attorney shall disclose to defense counsel all the material and information within the
prosecutor's possession or control .. "). This ABA standard is only very narrowly restricted,
granting discretion to the court to "deny, delay, or otherwise condition disclosure. . . if it finds
that there is a substantial risk. . . of physical harm, intimidation, or bribery resulting from such
disclosure which outweighs any usefulness to the defense counsel." Id at § 11-2.5. In addition,
no disclosure is required of a prosecutor's work product, of an informant's identity (except under
unusual circumstances), or when disclosure threatens national security. Id at § 11-2.6.
82. In support of its proposition for open file disclosure, the ABA argues that not only would
open file disclosure "provide the defendant with access to information necessary to test the credi-
bility of prosecution witnesses," but it would also "suggest to the defendant the appropriate course
and scope of his defense, thus contributing to the defendant's ability to exercise intelligently the
constitutional right to compulsory process." Id, Commentary to § 11-2.1(a) at 17-18.
83. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 105-06 (1970) (Burger, C.J., concurring); 2 ABA STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 81, Commentary to § 11-2.1(a), at 18.
84. See 2 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 81, Commentary to § II-
2.1(a), at 18.
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sent all exculpatory evidence, 85 the Court has not maintained that the
prosecutorial duty to disclose mandates complete relinquishment of the
prosecutor's files. 86 The Supreme Court's reluctance to require open
file disclosure may be attributed to traditional fears that such disclosure
will lead to subornation of perjury, bribery or intimidation of witnesses
and victims, and loss or destruction of physical evidence.87 Thus, the
prosecutor must disclose only evidence that is both favorable to the
defendant and material to the outcome of the trial.88
II. APPLICATION OF THE BRADY RULE TO UNREQUESTED
IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE: GARRISON V. MAGGIO
A. The Decision
The Agurs decision resolved a number of issues left open by Brady
and its progeny and established workable guidelines by which prosecu-
tors can assess their disclosure duties. Presented with a great variety of
fact situations, however, lower courts have frequently encountered dif-
ficulty in determining which Agurs standard to apply.89 In Garrison v.
85. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106-08 (1976); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786,
794-95 (1972); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87-88 (1963); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
86. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) ("there is ... no duty to provide defense
counsel with unlimited discovery of everything known by the prosecutor"); Moore v. Illinois, 408
U.S. 786, 795 (1972) ("[w]e know of no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a
complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case").
87. See Traynor, supra note 80, at 228-29. Comment, supra note 5, at 137-39. See Flannery,
The Prosecutor's Case Against Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 74 (1963); Comment, supra note 63, at
788. Some authorities, however, suggest that such fears are unjustified because of the availability
of protective orders for exceptional cases in which disclosure would cause harm to victims, wit-
nesses, or evidence. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, 14 (1975), reprinted
in 11975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 674, 686 (comments of the United States Attorney for
the Southern District of California before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act). See also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
supra note 81, Commentary to § 11 -2.1(a), at 17. Another means of eliminating these fears would
be to allow full disclosure only after the pretrial stages of a proceeding. For some types of evi-
dence, such as evidence impeaching witness' credibility, delayed disclosure would have no effect
on the defendant's case. Waiting until trial to disclose substantive exculpatory evidence, however,
would prevent a defendant from properly preparing and investigating his defense. Rusin, supra
note 31, at 218. This problem possibly could be overcome through a defense motion for a continu-
ance. See also 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1863, at 488 ("The possibility that a dishonest accused
will misuse such an opportunity is no reason for committing the injustice of refusing the honest
accused a fair means of clearing himself").
88. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84-85 (1963).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Gaston, 608 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1979) (court applied third rather
than second Agurs standard to case in which defense made specific request for exculpatory mate-
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Maggio,90 the Fifth Circuit found that the facts before it corresponded
with none of the three situations set forth in Agurs, and accordingly
formulated a separate materiality standard for what it perceived as a
fourth type of nondisclosure case. That situation, according to Garri-
son, arises when a prosecutor does not disclose voluntarily evidence
useful solely for impeachment purposes, and the defense fails specifi-
cally to request such evidence.9'
The petitioner in Garrison, convicted in a state proceeding for armed
robbery, filed a federal habeas corpus action alleging that the prosecu-
tor had failed to disclose a police report of an interview with the rob-
bery victim.92 At trial, the victim positively identified the petitioner as
the first of two robbers. 93 The victim's description of the first robber in
the police report, however, was entirely inconsistent with the peti-
tioner's actual physical appearance. 94 Nevertheless, the victim indi-
cated that the description he had given to investigating police officers
during the interview was consistent with his trial testimony.95 The peti-
tioner's trial counsel was unaware of the report and had made no pre-
trial request for disclosure of any exculpatory evidence.96
The district court granted relief, holding that the prosecutor's failure
to disclose the exculpatory information to the petitioner violated the
due process requirements espoused in Brady v. Maryland.97 The Fifth
Circuit, however, reversed the lower court's decision. 98
The circuit court began its analysis by recognizing the three catego-
rial); United States v. McCrane, 547 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1976) (court held that prosecutor's know-
ing failure to correct prior inconsistent statement amounted to favorable piece of evidence rather
than knowing use of perjury and applied third Agurs standard).
90. 540 F.2d 1271, 1274 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 940 (1977).
91. Id at 1274.
92. Id at 1272-73. At the state habeas corpus proceeding, the prosecutor testified that he did
not remember whether the police report had been in his trial file. The Fifth Circuit, however,
assumed that the prosecutor had possessed and read the report prior to trial. Id at 1273.
93. Id at 1272-73.
94. Id In the police report, the victim described the first robber as "about 6'1 " with a
"slender build." He identified this robber as the one who beat him with a shovel. He described
the other robber as "shorter" and "stocky." At trial, the victim identified the petitioner as being
the assailant. The petitioner, however, was "about five feet, five inches in height and stocky in
build." Id at 1272-73.
95. Id at 1273.
96. Id
97. Id at 1272. The district court, in an unpublished opinion, relied on both Brady v. Mary-
land, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), in reaching its holding.
98. 540 F.2d at 1272.
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ries of nondisclosure cases enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Agurs.99 The majority summarily dismissed the first two Agurs stan-
dards as inapplicable."°° Because the prosecutor failed to disclose vol-
untarily evidence favorable to the defense, the court concluded that the
third Agurs situation most closely resembled the Garrison facts.'
Rather than applying the reasonable doubt standard set forth in
Agurs, however, the Fifth Circuit enunciated an even stricter material-
ity standard, adopted from the test applied in Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 33 motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evi-
dence.10 2 The court reasoned that the substantive exculpatory evidence
suppressed in Agurs should be distinguished from the undisclosed im-
peachment evidence in the case before it.'0 3 Mandating prosecutorial
disclosure of evidence going to the merits of a case, argued the court,
enhances the truth-seeking function of the trial court by maximizing
the amount of relevant evidence before the jury. 0 4 In contrast, a re-
quirement of voluntary disclosure of evidence useful only for impeach-
ment purposes may make government witnesses reluctant to testify,
thereby inhibiting complete presentation of relevant evidence to the
jury. 5 Thus, the court found that before a new trial can be granted
for the nondisclosure of purely impeaching evidence, the defense must
demonstrate that disclosure of the evidence "probably would have re-
sulted in an acquittal."'106
Judge Wisdom, dissenting, 07 rejected the majority's adaptation of
the materiality standard used in Rule 33 motions to cases dealing with
prosecutorial nondisclosure of impeachment evidence. 08 He argued
99. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
100 540 F.2d at 1273. The case involved neither the prosecutor's failure to correct testimony
he knew to be false nor his failure to disclose requested exculpatory evidence.
101. Id This category includes cases in which the prosecutor fails voluntarily to disclose unre-
quested or only generally requested exculpatory evidence. See supra notes 61-65 and accompany-
ing text.
102. See supra note 65.
103. 540 F.2d at 1273-74.
104. Id at 1274. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
105. 540 F.2d at 1274. The court reasoned that Government witnesses would be "less open
with the prosecutor" and might even be totally unwilling to testify voluntarily. Id
106. Id See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 33. The majority concluded that because the victim's trial
identification was "'unequivocal," the undisclosed evidence satisfied neither the "probable acquit-
tal" standard nor the less severe reasonable doubt standard of Agurs. 540 F.2d at 1274.
107. Id at 1274 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
108, Id at 1275. Judge Wisdom explained in his dissenting opinion that theAgurs Court had
considered and rejected the Rule 33 standard because the undisclosed evidence had been in the
Number 11
Washington University Open Scholarship
182 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 61:163
that in order to safeguard a defendant's right to a fair trial, courts
should focus on the impact rather than on the type of undisclosed evi-
dence.1°9 He concluded that such a focus would command application
of the Agurs standard to impeachment as well as to substantive excul-
patory evidence."t0 The dissent reasoned that because substantive evi-
dence generally has greater probative value than impeachment
evidence, it is more likely to precipitate a reasonable doubt in the
minds of jurors. Thus, even if both types of evidence were subjected to
the Agurs reasonable doubt standard, the nondisclosure of impeach-
ment evidence would mandate a new trial less frequently.I'
In addition, Judge Wisdom repudiated the majority's characteriza-
tion of the undisclosed evidence in question as "purely impeaching."12
He asserted that beyond its value for impeachment purposes, the wit-
ness' prior inconsistent statement would have supported the petitioner's
substantive alibi defense.' The dissent argued that by using the po-
lice report to impeach the government's only witness, the petitioner
could have undermined the prosecution's entire case.' 14 Thus, the dis-
sent concluded that the petitioner's conviction should have been re-
versed under the Agurs reasonable doubt standard.115
possession of the prosecutor, who affirmatively decided not to reveal it, and not simply discovered
from a neutral source after trial. Id See supra note 68. The dissent argued that because this same
reasoning is applicable to impeaching evidence, the "probable acquittal" standard should be re-
jected here as well. Id
109. 540 F.2d at 1276.
110. Id Judge Wisdom stated, "I cannot acquiesce in the majority's view that due process is
not violated where the prosecution fails to disclose evidence within its control that 'creates a rea-
sonable doubt that did not otherwise exist' simply because the evidence is deemed 'impeaching'
rather than 'exculpatory.'" Id (footnote omitted).
Ill. id
112. Id at 1277.
113. Id at 1276-77. Petitioner's sole defense was alibi. He claimed that he was at his sister's
house during the entire morning that the shooting took place. Petitioner's testimony was corrobo-
rated by that of his sister and her two daughters. The prosecutor testified that he thought the
petitioner's alibi witnesses were credible. Id at 1276.
114. Id at 1277. Judge Wisdom stated:
Characterization problems similar to the one in this case will undoubtedly arise when-
ever the evidence undisclosed by the prosecution involves a statement by an important
prosecution witness that conflicts with his testimony at trial. Thus, the distinction the
majority draws between exculpatory and impeaching evidence, for purposes of
prosecutorial disclosure, is not only unnecessary; it is largely unworkable.
Id
115. Id at 1277-78.
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B. Reception in the Circuits
Prior to Garrison many courts, including the Fifth Circuit, held that
undisclosed evidence not directly material to guilt or punishment, but
only to the credibility of a prosecution witness, could constitute a Brady
violation."I6 Additionally, Supreme Court as well as lower court deci-
sions frequently recognized the significant effect that impeachment evi-
dence could have on the outcome of a trial." 7  Although these
decisions generally considered the nature of the undisclosed evidence
in determining whether the nondisclosure constituted a reversable er-
ror,t t they did not apply separate materiality standards to impeach-
ment evidence." 9 Not surprisingly, then, the circuits disagree on
whether to follow the Fifth Circuit's lead by applying the probable ac-
quittal standard of materiality to cases dealing with unrequested, 20 un-
116. See, e.g., United States v. McCrane, 547 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Sutton,
542 F.2d 1239 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Pacelli, 491 F.2d 1108, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826
(1974); United States v. Fried, 486 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 983 (1974);
United States v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1973); Corpus v. Beto, 469 F.2d 953 (5th Cir.
1972); United States v. Harris, 462 F.2d 1033 (10th Cir. 1972); Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797
(5th Cir. 1968); Loraine v. United States, 396 F.2d 335 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 932 (1968).
The factual situations of these cases demonstrate, however, that the impeachment evidence must
go to a key prosecution witness in order to be considered sufficiently material.
117. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (jury's estimate of truthfulness and
reliability of a key witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence); Napue v. Illinois, 360
U.S. 264 (1959) (same); United States v. Hildebrand, 506 F.2d 406 (5th Cir.) (Brady applies to
both exculpatory and impeaching evidence given that both can affect verdict), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 968 (1975); United States v. McGovern, 499 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1974) (same); United States v.
Kaplan, 470 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1972) (same).
118. See, e.g., Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31-32 (1957) (unsolicited perjured testimony
typed as impeaching); United States v. Crockett, 534 F.2d 589, 601 (5th Cir. 1976) (evidence of
witness' prior criminal record typed as impeaching); Shuler v. Wainwright, 491 F.2d 1213, 1222-23
(5th Cir. 1974) (evidence of victim's prior inconsistent statement typed as impeaching). See also
supra cases cited at note 117. See generally Comment, supra note 63, at 790-95 (author distin-
guishes among eyewitnesses testimony, physical evidence, impeachment evidence, and evidence of
witness' inconsistent statements). The results in cases involving undisclosed evidence vary de-
pending on the type of evidence disclosed.
119. See supra cases cited notes 117-18. See also United States v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55, 57
(5th Cir. 1973); Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797, 800 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Hearst, 424
F. Supp. 307, 313 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aft'd, 563 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1977).
120. All circuits agree that when a specific defense request is made for impeachment evidence,
the second Agurs materiality test should be applied. A new trial will be mandated if the sup-
pressed impeachment evidence "might have affected the outcome of the trial." See Scurr v. Nic-
cum, 620 F.2d 186, 189-91 (8th Cir. 1980) (failure to disclose evidence impeaching sole accomplice
despite specific defense request requires reversal); Monroe v. Blackburn, 607 F.2d 148, 151-52 (5th
Cir. 1979) (failure to disclose impeachment evidence addressing substantive issue upon request
mandates reversal), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980); United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769,
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disclosed impeachment evidence.' 2 '
The Fifth Circuit continues routinely to follow its Garrison hold-
ing. 22 Recently, in United States v. Mesa, 23 the court found that non-
disclosure of evidence impeaching a government informant's good
character did not warrant a new trial because it satisfied neither the
Agurs reasonable doubt standard nor the probable acquittal standard
enunciated in Garrison.24 Although the Fifth Circuit has applied the
Garrison standard to numerous cases, it has never reversed a defend-
ant's conviction on the ground that the undisclosed evidence probably
would have produced an acquittal.'
25
In United States v. Jackson,2 6 the Tenth Circuit indicated ap-
proval 27 of the Fifth Circuit's approach by holding that a prosecutor's
failure to disclose voluntarily evidence of payment to a government
witness did not require a new trial, because the evidence probably
would not result in an acquittal on retrial.' 28 The Tenth Circuit, how-
ever, has never expressly adopted the Garrison standard.
Other circuit courts remain unreceptive to the Fifth Circuit's sepa-
rate standard of materiality for impeachment evidence.' 29 The First
Circuit has repeatedly decided to leave the question open,130 frequently
774 (2d Cir. 1979) (failure to disclose witness' comments pursuant to a specific request does not
demand new trial where comments did not sufficiently impeach witness so as to affect the outcome
of trial), cert. granted, 444 U.S. 1070 (1980).
121. See infra notes 121-42 and accompanying text.
122. See United States v. Mesa, 660 F.2d 1070, 1076-77 (5th Cir. 1981); Hughes v. Hopper, 629
F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1980); Monroe v. Blackburn, 607 F.2d 148, 151 (5th Cir. 1979), cert,
denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980); United States v. Parker, 586 F.2d 422, 435 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 962 (1978); Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 363 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane); United States
v. Anderson, 574 F.2d 1347, 1354 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Crisp, 563 F.2d 1242, 1245 (5th
Cir. 1977); Schneider v. Estelle, 552 F.2d 593, 595 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Blalock, 449 F.
Supp. 916, 920 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
123. 660 F.2d 1070 (1981).
124. Id at 1076.
125. See supra cases cited at note 122.
126. 579 F.2d 553 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978).
127. The Jackson court did not explicitly cite the Fifth Circuit's decision in Garrison v.
Magglo.
128. Id at 560. The court noted that the Rule 33 probable acquittal standard is not generally
applied to cases involving nondisclosure of impeachment evidence, but nevertheless proceeded to
adopt the standard. The court did not reveal its reasoning in making this determination. Id. at
557. In reaching its holding, the court reasoned that the witness' testimony was well-corroborated
by other witnesses and documentation.
129. See infra notes 130-41 and accompanying text.
130. See United States v. Talavera, 668 F.2d 625, 632 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2245
(1982); Zeigler v. Callahan, 659 F.2d 254, 266 (1st Cir. 1981); Mains v. Butterworth, 619 F.2d 83,
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finding that the undisclosed evidence satisfies neither Agurs nor Garri-
son.' A majority of the circuits that have considered the issue, how-
ever, have explicitly rejected Garrison, choosing instead to retain the
A4gurs reasonable doubt standard.132
In United States ex rel. Annunziato v. Manson,t33 for instance, the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut adopted the
Supreme Court's standard, asserting that although Agurs dealt only
with substantive evidence withheld by the prosecution, its holding
should apply equally to undisclosed impeachment evidence. 34 Citing
both Napue v. Illinois 35 and Giglio v. United States,136 the court rea-
soned that impeachment evidence is often as significant as substantive
exculpatory evidence in determining a defendant's guilt or inno-
cence.' 37  The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding,
thereby adopting the Agurs materiality standard. 38
While the Eighth and Ninth Circuits employ similar rationales in
applying Agurs rather than Garrison, the Seventh Circuit reached the
same result by asserting that the distinction between the two standards
is "chimerical." 4 ° Evidence that creates a reasonable doubt as to a de-
fendant's guilt, reasoned the court in Ruiz v. Cady, should produce an
acquittal. 14 1 State courts that have confronted the issue also refuse to
implement a different materiality standard for impeachment
evidence. 142
86 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 864 (1980); United States v. Imbruglia, 617 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir.
1980); United States v. Strahl, 590 F.2d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1978).
131. The First Circuit typically acknowledges the Garrison standard and proceeds to state that
a decision between Garrison and 4gurs is unnecessary, as the undisclosed evidence in question
satisfies neither test. See, e.g., Mains v. Butterworth, 619 F.2d at 86.
132. See infra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
133. 425 F. Supp. 1272 (D. Conn. 1976), afd, 566 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1977). In.4nnuziato, the
prosecutor failed to disclose promises of leniency made to a state's witness. Id at 1272-73.
134. Id at 1280. The court argued that, "the same standard applies whether the nondisclosed
evidence goes to the fact of the crime or tends to impeach a critical witness .. " Id
135. 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
136. 405 U.S. 105, 154 (1972). See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
137. 425 F. Supp. at 1280. The court held that had the undisclosed evidence been introduced
to the jury, it "would have created a reasonable doubt as to petitioner's guilt." Id
138. United States ex rel. Annuziato v. Manson, 566 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1977).
139. See United States v. Young, 618 F.2d 1281, 1287 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 844
(1980); United States v. Ramirez, 608 F.2d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Lasky, 548
F.2d 835, 839 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Hearst, 435 F. Supp. 29, 31 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
140. Ruiz v. Cady, 635 F.2d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 1980), rey'd, 660 F.2d 337 (1981).
141. Id at 586-87.
142. See, e.g., Strickland v. United States, 389 A.2d 1325, 1328 (D.C. Ct. App. 1978); Williams
Washington University Open Scholarship
186 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 61:163
III. ANALYSIS
United States v. Agurs'4 3 provides no support for the Fifth Circuit's
distinction between types of evidence and its implementation of a sepa-
rate materiality standard for impeachment evidence. Although Agurs
does not explicitly hold that the standard of materiality should be iden-
tical whether the evidence is substantively exculpatory or purely im-
peaching, neither does it distinguish between the two types of evidence.
The Agurs Court based its delineation of materiality standards on the
circumstances surrounding the particular nondisclosure, not on the
type of undisclosed evidence.' 44
Following the Supreme Court's reasoning, lower courts should apply
the same standard of materiality regardless of whether the undisclosed
evidence is substantive or impeaching in nature. Because impeachment
evidence is characteristically less likely to affect the defendant's guilt or
punishment,' 45  nondisclosure will rarely command a reversal, even
under the Agurs standard of review.'
46
Nevertheless, the Garrison majority argued that impeachment evi-
dence warrants a stricter materiality standard because the probative
value of such evidence is less than that of substantive evidence. 47 This
argument overlooks the well-established notion that impeachment evi-
dence can be as exculpatory as evidence going directly to the merits of
v. Commonwealth, 569 S.W.2d 139, 143 (Ky. 1978); State v. Falkins, 356 So. 2d 415, 419 (La.
1978); State v. Eldridge, 412 A.2d 62, 67 (Me. 1980); Commonwealth v. Ellison, 376 Mass. 1, 24,
372 N.E.2d 560 (1978); Cassibry v. State, 404 So. 2d 1360, 1371 (Miss. 1981); Lee v. State, 573
S.W.2d 131, 133 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Quinones v. Texas, 592 S.W.2d 933, 941 (Tex.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 893 (1980).
143. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
144. See supra notes 51-65 and accompanying text. See also Rusin, supra note 31, at 212.
145. Evidence directly impeaching a witness' credibility as to one of the facts in issue often has
as much probative value as substantive exculpatory evidence. More frequently, however, im-
peachment evidence serves to attack the witness' credibility in general. Nondisclosure of this type
of evidence in most cases will have little effect on the outcome of a case. See Garrison v. Maggio,
540 F.2d 1271, 1276 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 940 (1976) (Wisdom, J., dissenting). See gener-
ally infra notes 146-58 and accompanying text.
146. See 540 F.2d 1271, 1274 ("even under the reasonable doubt standard of.Agurs, the [un-
disclosed evidence] does not pass the test"). See also Mains v. Butterworth, 619 F.2d 83, 86 (1st
Cir.) (nondisclosure of evidence indicating witness' intoxication did not require reversal under
reasonable doubt standard), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 864 (1980); United States v. Gloria, 494 F.2d
477, 484 (5th Cir. 1974) (undisclosed evidence of prior misdemeanor convictions does not consti-
tute reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 995 (1974); Link v. United
States, 352 F.2d 207, 212 (8th Cir.) (nondisclosure of witness' prior misidentification not grounds
for reversal under reasonable doubt standard), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 915 (1965).
147. 540 F.2d at 1274. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
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the case. 148 Numerous lower courts, for example, have held that undis-
closed evidence satisfies the Brady materiality standard if such evi-
dence can be used to impeach the credibility of a key prosecution
witness. 149
Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the crit-
ical role impeachment evidence may play in a criminal proceeding. 5 °
In Napue v. Illinois,'I' for instance, the Court observed that the duty to
disclose does not cease merely because the undisclosed evidence relates
only to the credibility of a witness. 152 The jury's characterization of the
veracity of a particular witness, argued the Court, may determine the
outcome of a case. 153
In addition, evidence affecting a witness' credibility may simultane-
ously constitute substantive exculpatory evidence.' 54 In Giles v. Mary-
land, 55 for example, an undisclosed police report contained statements
that were inconsistent with the prosecutrix's rape allegation. 56 The
Supreme Court held that this evidence was relevant not only to the
148 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 116, 133 & 134 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Poole,
379 F.2d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 1967) (Brady materiality requirement met where substantial likelihood
evidence impeaching credibility of key state witness would have affected outcome of trial); Ingram
v. Peyton, 367 F.2d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1966) (same); Link v. United States, 352 F.2d 207, 212 (8th
Cir. 1965) (evidence impeaching key witness can be "of such inherent significance as to represent
fundamental unfairness"); Expare Turner, 545 S.W.2d 470, 473 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (Brady
materiality requirement met where state failed to disclose knowledge of key witness' motivation to
fabricate testimony).
150. See infra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
151. 360 U.S. 264 (1959). See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
152. 360 U.S. at 269.
153. Id See also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (Court adopts verbatim
argument in Napue). See generally supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text. Prior inconsistent statements in particu-
lar are often relevant to the material facts in issue. See, e.g., Garrison v. Maggio, 540 F.2d 1271,
1277 (5th Cir. 1976) (Wisdom, J., dissenting) ("[T]he notion that a witness' prior inconsistent state-
ments may constitute substantive exculpatory evidence, in addition to being useful for impeach-
ment, is not a new one"), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 940 (1977).
155. 386 U.S. 66 (1967). See supra note 46.
156. 386 U.S. at 71-72. The police report revealed that: (1) the prosecutrix was on probation
at the time of the alleged rape for juvenile delinquency; (2) five weeks after the alleged rape the
prosecutrix had sexual relationships with two men and later took an overdose of sleeping pills;
(3) the prosecutrix's boyfriend testified that he and the prosecutrix were engaging in sexual rela-
tions in the back of his automobile when the two alleged rapists approached the car; (4) the prose-
cutrix had admitted that in the previous two years she had had sexual relations with numerous
men, some of whom she did not know; and (5) the prosecutrix had previously been hospitalized in
a psychiatric ward. Id at 69-71.
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credibility of the prosecution witnesses, but also to the material fact at
issue of "whether [the defendant] had raped the girl."1 57 Similarly, the
Fifth Circuit itself previously found that evidence capable of impeach-
ing a witness' testimony was also material to a defendant's principle
defense. 158
Assuming arguendo the validity of the Garrison distinction, however,
it is not clear that the Fifth Circuit accomplished its goal. The Garrison
majority sought to adopt a stricter standard of materiality for unre-
quested impeachment evidence than for unrequested substantive evi-
dence.'59 The Garrison court naturally looked to theAgurs opinion1 60
for guidance in determining what sort of standard to implement. 161
In defining the third level of materiality, applicable in the absence of
a specific request for exculpatory information, 162 the Agurs Court dis-
carded as too stringent the probable acquittal standard customarily
used in Rule 33 motions for a new trial based on newly discovered
157. Id at 77. See also Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31-32 (Court acknowledges substantive
value of prior inconsistent statements).
158. Davis v. Heyd, 479 F.2d 446, 453 (5th Cir. 1973). The Garrison court, however, failed to
recognize that impeachment evidence can have a substantive effect on an alibi defense.
The material value of impeachment evidence, of course, ultimately depends on a myriad of
considerations, including the nature of the impeachment, the severity of the impeachment, and the
significance of the witness involved to the particular case. For instance, evidence that may directly
impeach a witness' credibility on material facts in issue, such as evidence of prior inconsistent
statements about important facts, prior misidentifications, and bias, will satisfy the Brady materi-
ality requirement far more frequently than evidence attacking only the general character of a
witness. Compare Norris v. Slayton, 540 F.2d 1241 (4th Cir. 1976) (nondisclosure of witness' prior
misidentification required reversal under Brady) and Carter v. State, 237 Ga. 617, 229 S.E.2d 411
(1976) (nondisclosure of witness' prior inconsistent statement required reversal under Brady) with
United States v. Stassi, 544 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976) (nondisclosure of evidence of bad acts on part
of witness not material within meaning of Brady rule). Similarly, impeachment evidence that
completely devastates the veracity of a witness is more probative than evidence that reveals only
minor inconsistencies. See, e.g., United States v. Hedgeman, 564 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1977) (no
disclosure required where evidence only arguably impeaches a witness); United States v. Hearst,
424 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (no disclosure required where evidence only partially im-
peaches the witness), aff'd, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977); Jefferson v. State, 141 Ga. App. 712, 234
S.E.2d 333 (1977) (no disclosure required if inconsistencies between prior statement and trial testi-
mony only slight). Finally, the nondisclosure of evidence that impeaches a critical government
witness is more likely to require a new trial than is evidence of a witness that is corroborated by
other witnesses. See supra cases cited at notes 116 & 149. See generally E. CLEARY (ed.), McCor-
mick on Evidence § 41, at 81-82 (2d ed. 1979); Rusin, supra note 31, at 212-14.
159. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 99-101, infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
161. 540 F.2d 1271, 1273-74 (1976).
162. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
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evidence.' 63 TheAgurs Court reasoned that a more flexible standard of
materiality should apply to newly discovered evidence found in the
possession of the prosecutor who is under a special disclosure duty than
to evidence discovered from a neutral source, to whom no such duty
attaches. 164 Thus, the Supreme Court proceeded to adopt the reason-
able doubt standard, which it perceived as less strict.
165
Whether the Rule 33 "probable acquittal" standard is in fact more
stringent than the reasonable doubt standard, however, is debatable.
TheAgurs dissent argued that the two standards are coterminus. 166 The
majority's test, that the evidence in the context of the entire record must
raise a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt in the mind of the
judge, inevitably would require a showing that the evidence probably
would have produced an acquittal. 67 The Seventh Circuit reiterated
this argument in Ruiz v. Cady.
168
Not only is the Fifth Circuit's approach logically inconsistent with
prior Supreme Court holdings 169 and of questionable validity as a
"stricter" materiality standard, 7 ° it is also contrary to the policies un-
derlying Brady and its progeny.' 7' Because lower courts are naturally
inclined to adopt the Supreme Court's appraisal of the relative strin-
gency of the reasonable doubt and the probable acquittal standards, 7
2
they will continue to interpret the latter as more stringent. As the post-
163. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
164. 427 U.S. at 111. In reaching this conclusion, theAgurs Court reasoned that if the Rule 33
standard were applied "there would be no special significance to the prosecutor's obligation to
serve the cause ofjustice." Id One commentator argues, however, that ordinary witnesses have a
civic obligation to come forward with any evidence they may possess in order to ensure that
justice is achieved in the courts. See 14 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 319, supra note 70, at 328 n.67.
165. 427 U.S. at 111.
166, Id at 116.
167. Id Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent, stated:
[Tlhe burden. . . imposed [by the majority] is at least as severe.., as the burden [the
defendant] generally faces on a Rule 33 motion. Surely if a judge is able to say that
evidence actually creates a reasonable doubt as to guilt in his mind (the Court's stan-
dard), he would also conclude that the evidence 'probably would have resulted in acquit-
tal' (the general Rule 33 standard).
Id
168. Ruiz v. Cady, 635 F.2d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 660 F.2d 337 (1981). For a discus-
sion of Ruiz, see supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 143-58 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 140, 141, 167 & 168 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 69-88 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., cases cited at notes 122, 130, 133, 138-40 & 142. See also Garrison v. Maggio,
540 F.2d 1273, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 940 (1977).
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Garrison decisions illustrate, courts implementing the probable acquit-
tal standard very rarely require reversals for prosecutorial nondisclo-
sure of impeachment evidence.17 3  Being virtually certain that their
failure to reveal exculpatory impeachment evidence to the defense will
not be successfully challenged on appeal, prosecutors will have no in-
centive to fulfill their disclosure duties. Thus, not only will the Fifth
Circuit's approach destroy the defendant's opportunity to present all
favorable evidence to the jury, but it will encourage prosecutorial mis-
conduct as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit's distinction between impeaching and substantive
exculpatory evidence, apart from being of questionable validity, is un-
supported by previous Supreme Court decisions. Recognizing that im-
peachment evidence can be as exculpatory as substantive evidence and
that it may even directly affect the material facts in issue, the Supreme
Court delineated materiality standards based on the circumstances in
which the nondisclosure arose, not on the nature of the undisclosed
evidence. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit's approach is inconsistent with
the policies underlying the disclosure duty. Implementation of the
probable acquittal standard is repugnant not only to the deterrence ra-
tionale emphasized in the early nondisclosure cases, but also to the
Supreme Court's focus in Brady and its progeny on the defendant's
right to a fair trial. Thus, the criminal defendant's constitutional inter-
ests will best be served if courts continue to reject the Fifth Circuit's
approach to undisclosed, unrequested impeachment evidence.
D. Jeanne Knowles
173. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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